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Admiral Kingsmill and the Early 
Years of the Royal Canadian Navy
Part III
Roger Sarty
Following is the fourth document in a series assembled to support the creation of a plaque in honour of 
Admiral Kingsmill by the Ontario Heritage Trust. The plaque is located at his burial place, Emmanuel 
Anglican Church Cemetery, Portland, Ontario, near the location of Kingsmill’s summer home on Grindstone 
Island, and was unveiled in a ceremony on 15 May 2010. Part I of this series appears in Vol.19 no.1 (Winter 
2010), pp.75-80 and part II in Vol.19 no.2 (Spring 2010), pp.76-80.
Kingsmill to Secretary of the Admiralty, 22 November 1917 (Library and Archives Canada, Record Group 
24, Volume 3831, file NS 1017-10-1 part 1).
Editor’s note: Here is Kingsmill’s blow by blow account of the development of the Canadian navy’s east coast anti-submarine flotilla 
in the critical year from November 1916 to November 1917. During that period the u-boat threat to Canadian waters became much 
more pressing in the wake of U-53’s pioneering transatlantic mission of October 1916 in which she destroyed five Allied merchant 
vessels off the coast of New England. The memorandum begins with the British Admiralty’s advice in November 1916 that Canada 
should triple the strength of its coastal patrol of 12 small steamers. Yet, as Kingsmill explains, Canada had no resources; neither did 
Britain, which soon faced a renewed U-boat offensive off the west cost of the British Isles. The memorandum records the resulting 
tensions between the Canadian and British naval authorities, and the measures they managed to concert, primarily by resorting 
to construction of anti-submarine craft in Canadian shipyards. 
 The efforts described in the memorandum laid the groundwork for the rapid expansion of the Canadian anti-submarine flotilla, 
largely with the Canadian-built craft, to a force of some 130 vessels crewed by 5,000 personnel in 1918. The British answers to the 
pointed questions Kingsmill poses in the last part of the document about the level of the threat to Canada and the specific defences 
required – British signals intelligence indicated a strong possibility that large u-boats would come to North American waters as 
early as the spring of 1918 – triggered the all out push for expansion. As it happened, the expanded force deployed barely in time 
to strengthen merchant ship convoy defences against three large u-boats that hunted in Canadian waters in August and September 
1918. 
 The memorandum is a good example of Kingsmill’s plain speaking with British naval authorities in defence of Canadian 
interests and those of the new Canadian navy despite his 39-year career in the British service.
Document 4
Admiral Kingsmill’s review of the U-boat threat and the 
development of anti-submarine defence measures on 
Canada’s east coast in 1916 to 1917
© Canadian Military History, Volume 19, Number 4, Autumn 2010, pp.75-80.
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Secret.
From Director of Naval Service of Canada.
To Secretary of the Admiralty, London, 
S.W.I.
- 22nd November, 1917.
 It is requested that the following may 
be laid before the Lords Commissioners 
of the Admiralty for their consideration. 
 It is desired to point out that the 
Naval Policy of Canada has never been 
clearly defined, nor has the Imperial 
Government ever clearly advised the 
Dominion Government as to what the 
Admiralty expected of the Department 
of the Naval Service of Canada in the 
way of offensive or defensive measures. 
The Department, therefore, desire to lay 
before Their Lordships the situation as it 
now is, and to draw attention to several 
points that are not clearly defined as 
regards expansion, and on which advice 
is asked:-
 In November, 1916, a telegram was 
received from the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies, dated 11th November, 
advising that the patrol of Newfoundland 
and the Canadian Coasts was considered 
inadequate, and suggesting that the force 
should be increased to thirty-six vessels, 
and at the same time offering to send an 
officer to assist in the organization of such 
patrol, and in procuring the necessary 
vessels, etc., etc. This telegram was no 
doubt sent after the despatch of a letter, 
M.09462/16, dated 7th November, 1916, 
from the Secretary of the Admiralty to the 
Governor of Newfoundland, and which is 
a reply to his letter of the 25th October, 
No.47344.
 To the telegram of the 11th November, 
the Canadian Government replied in the 
following terms on the 18th November:-
“Canadian Government notes that 
Admiralty consider that present 
twelve vessels are insufficient means 
against serious attack on trade 
on these waters and that thirty-six 
vessels are considered necessary.
“It is desired to point out, however, 
that in accordance with wishes of 
Admiralty every possible trained 
seaman has been sent over to 
England, whilst active recruiting is 
now being carried on for men to serve 
overseas in the Royal Navy. Further, 
when Canadian Government was 
disposed to build destroyers early 
this year Admiralty did not encourage 
idea.
“Representative of War Office has 
recently been allowed to purchase 
or charter in Canada a number of 
vessels which might have been 
useful for patrol work, although 
number of such in Canada is strictly 
limited.
“As danger to Admiralty Store 
transports and Canadian trade in 
near future from enemy submarines 
appears to be growing serious, 
Canadian Government considers 
adequate protection should be 
accorded by Admiralty.”
and on December 28th, 1916, the 
following was sent:-
“Secret. My advisers desire to 
call attention to the telegram from 
Admiralty through Colonial Secretary 
Top: U-53 photographed during its visit 
to Newport, Rhode Island on 7 October 
1916. The United States was still 
neutral and the visit was intended to 
impress the Americans with the power 
and transatlantic reach of the German 
submarine fleet. The next day the u-boat 
captured and sank five merchantmen, 
three British, one Norwegian and one 
Dutch. US destroyers were present but 
because of American neutrality were 
unable to do anything but rescue the 
crews and passengers of the ships.
Bottom: U-155 (the ex-Deutschland, 
a mercantile type submarine that 
had been heavily armed with 15 cm 
guns, torpedoes and mines) operated 
off Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and 
the northeastern US from August to 
October 1918. She laid 14 mines in the 
southern approaches to Halifax on 17-
18 September, which did no damage. 
Several broke loose (and were thus 
automatically rendered ‘safe’) and were 
recovered by Canadian fishermen who 
each received a $25 reward from the 
Canadian navy.
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of 11th November last and to their 
reply to Colonial Secretary of 18th 
November as well as their further 
cables of 7th and 15th December to 
none of which any reply has been 
received. In May last Minister of 
Naval Service suggested to Admiralty 
advisabil i ty of his Department 
constructing three torpedo boat 
destroyers at Canadian Vickers yards 
but Admiralty’s reply was regarded 
as discouraging the proposal. In 
early months of the war my advisers 
requested advice from Admiralty as 
to advisability of Canada undertaking 
to supplement naval defence of 
Empire and reply received indicated 
Admiralty view that such action was 
unnecessary and that Canada’s 
efforts should be concentrated on 
provision of military forces. Under 
these circumstances the Admiralty’s 
intimation that we must provide 
against danger of submarines on 
our coast is very serious especially 
as many boats suitable for patrol 
work were acquired by War Office 
in Canada in September last and 
the recruiting for overseas forces in 
Canada has denuded this country of 
most suitable men for such purpose, 
and every available gun has been 
sent to the British Government. 
My advisers would be grateful for 
immediate reply to unanswered 
te leg rams  above  men t i oned 
and for a precise statement of 
the Admiralty’s ability to provide 
against danger of submarines on our 
coast. If responsibility for protection 
of our coast against submarines 
must be undertaken by Canadian 
Government immediate action 
is imperative and it is absolutely 
essential that the officer asked for in 
despatch of 15th December should 
be sent immediately.” 
to which, on the 10th January 1917, the 
following reply was received:-
“Your telegram 29th December. It is 
recognized by Admiralty that situation 
is one of considerable difficulty for 
your Ministers but they greatly regret 
that dearth of small craft at home 
makes it impossible to provide any 
patrol vessels from United Kingdom 
for service in Canadian waters. 
Need for such craft however is very 
urgent and although it is desirable 
to build some at once it is still more 
necessary to make use of any which 
are or could be made available 
immediately. Patrols in home waters 
are composed mainly of trawlers low 
speed and general type of vessel 
required is one of good sea-going 
qualities capable of carrying twelve-
pounder quick-firing gun and wireless 
telegraph installation smaller guns 
being unsuitable. It is suggested by 
Admiralty that your Ministers should 
consider whether suitable vessels 
of similar type could be obtained 
from whalers and sea-going fishing 
vessels with auxiliary motive power. 
Officer with practical experience 
of auxiliary patrol at home will be 
sent to Canada immediately and will 
render all possible assistance to your 
Ministers in organization of service 
generally. Will reply as soon as 
possible as regards proposal to take 
over ships being built for Norwegian 
owners.”
In reply to this, on the 16th January 
1917, the Dominion Government sent 
the following:-
“With reference to your telegram 
10th January and 11th November 
every effort is being made to secure 
either by purchase or building the 
vessels suggested in latter. Naval 
Department has no reserve of trained 
seamen or guns as all spare guns 
have been transferred to England. 
Can Admiralty provide requisite 
number of guns and sufficient trained 
men for each with instructional petty 
officers and armourer ratings Stop 
RAINBOW is approaching time when 
extensive refit absolutely necessary, 
if she were paid off number of 
trained men would be available and 
four 12-pdr. guns, also six 4.7 guns 
would be liberated for defence of 
merchantmen.”
and on the 27th January a further 
telegram from the Prime Minister to Sir 
Edward Carson, marked secret, was sent, 
stating what we were doing to get the 
thirty-six vessels suggested, and pointing 
out our poverty as regards guns, and 
asking the First Lord’s personal interest, 
as the responsibilities placed upon the 
Canadian Government in this respect 
were quite unexpected, having reference 
to previous advice given that danger was 
potential, etc. In reply, a telegram dated 
30th January was received, stating the 
arrangements that would be made as to 
supply of guns.
 On the 5th February 1917, a telegram 
was received as follows:-
“5th February. Shipbuilding. With 
reference to your telegram 8th 
December view of Admiralty is 
that Canadian resources should 
immediately be utilized for output of 
Dazzle-painted merchantmen put to sea 
in convoy from Halifax in 1917 or 1918.
D
ep
ar
tm
en
t o
f N
at
io
na
l D
ef
en
ce
 (D
N
D
) p
ho
to
 C
N
-6
9
0
3
Kingsmill doc RCN patrols.indd   3 1/24/2011   12:43:49 PM
3
: Admiral Kingsmill and the Early Years of the Royal Canadian Navy Part III
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2010
78
suitable steamers from Canadian 
yards which would be property of and 
paid for by His Majesty’s Government 
and James Esplen is being instructed 
to place himself in communication 
with Imperial Munitions Board and 
supervise arrangements in concert 
with them.
“This programme is not concerned 
with Naval construction dealt with 
in my telegram February 5th above 
mentioned but only with mercantile 
shipping.
“From international standpoint the 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
recently advised that there was no 
objection to taking over ships now 
building for Norwegian owners.”
 The penultimate paragraph led 
us to suppose that information would 
be received as to the allocation of the 
drifters and trawlers referred to as “Naval 
construction”, but nothing was heard until 
the arrival of Admiral Sir C. Coke with two 
officer overseers on his staff.
 Apparently before leaving England, 
the Commodore was informed that 
the drifters and trawlers mentioned in 
telegram of the 5th February 1917, were 
for operation on the Atlantic seaboard, 
and his statement to that effect was 
the first that was known here that these 
vessels were to be utilized on these 
coasts, nor have the Department yet 
heard from the Admiralty direct that this 
was ever their intention.
patrol boats that is steel vessels of 
trawler type with as good speed as 
can be obtained on the dimensions 
and wooden steam drifters say thirty-
six of the former and one hundred 
of the latter. Admiralty would be 
glad if Canadian Government could 
undertake this programme and if 
so could state as early as possible 
by what date vessels could be 
constructed. These vessels are 
additional not only to the thirteen 
already in commission but also to 
the twenty-two others for the building 
or purchase of which your Ministers 
are understood to be arranging. 
Designs are being prepared of 
vessels considered most suitable 
and will be sent for the guidance 
of your Ministers if they decide to 
undertake work. It is understood that 
information in Canada as to designs 
and costs of drifters which might be 
built has already been collected by 
the Imperial Munitions Board.”
and replied to in the following terms on 
the 8th February 1917:-
“Your cable fifth respecting ship 
building. My advisors are prepared 
to undertake proposed programme 
for His Majesty’s Government and 
will proceed immediately with orders 
for the construction of thirty-six 
steel vessels trawler type with as 
good speed as can be obtained on 
the dimensions, and one hundred 
wooden steam drifters. They will 
avail themselves of all information 
as to design and cost which has 
been collected by the Imperial 
Munitions Board but they hope that 
detailed designs and all necessary 
information not procurable here will 
be forwarded with the least possible 
delay.”
 From then on, several telegrams 
were sent, but in none of them was there 
any hint that the Admiralty intended these 
vessels were for use in the Western 
Atlantic, or were to form part of the 
Newfoundland and Canadian Patrol. The 
following points out that the building of 
ships or vessels in Canada formed part 
of a general scheme to increase output, 
but speaks of two programmes:-
“London, February 12th 1917. With 
reference to my telegram February 
5th. There has been recently adopted 
a scheme for securing as much as 
possible of prospect of output of 
shipbuilding yards of United States 
for His Majesty’s Government. For the 
purpose of supervising arrangements 
John Esplen Sons and Swainson 
Consulting Engineers, has been 
attached to Department of Controller 
of Shipping and negotiations in 
America are being conducted under 
his general direction by James 
Esplen in conjunction with Cunard 
Company. Shipping Controller is 
anxious to extend scope of this 
scheme to Canada for my securing 
as large an output as possible of 
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Anti-submarine trawlers fitting out at either Montreal or Quebec City in 1917, or more likely, 1918.
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 There were certain arrangements 
made as to manning these drifters and 
trawlers which led the Department to 
suppose they were intended for other 
waters and several questions as to the 
disposal of the drifters asked by telegram 
still remain unanswered.
 In August, 1917, Commodore Sir 
C. Coke, R.N.R., returned, and Acting 
Captain J.O. Hatcher was proposed as 
a relief, and his services were gladly 
accepted on the understanding that he 
would be appointed to command Patrols 
if it was thought desirable, meaning by the 
Department. There was apparently some 
misunderstanding about this, and Captain 
Hatcher was given to understand that he 
had been sent to command Patrols, and 
arrived to find that such appointment 
had been given to Acting Captain Walter 
Hose, R.C.N., which must have been a 
disappointment to him, although he at 
once said he was willing and anxious to 
do anything. 
 Commodore Sir C. Coke, on arrival in 
Canada, looked into the question of anti-
submarine defence and demanded some 
quantities of stores for mine sweeping, 
depth charges, hydrophones, indicator 
nets for drifters, and fittings. These 
requests for stores were forwarded by 
telegram to the Admiralty, from time to 
time. Little progress was made as it was 
found impossible to forward the stores: 
moreover, strikes occurred in different 
localities and no ships were ready.
 Acting Captain Hatcher, on arrival, 
went into the matter of anti-submarine 
defence. His proposed scheme for 
defence against submarines was drawn 
up on the assumption that the vessels 
available would number one hundred 
drifters and fifty trawlers in addition to 
original thirty-six patrol vessels, and 
necessitated a demand for still more 
stores. He also requested that paravanes 
might be ordered, and the matter was 
taken up with the Admiralty. Evidently 
Captain Hatcher was not very well up in 
the use of paravanes for small ships, as 
will be seen by the attached telegrams.
 Not long after his arrival, it was 
proposed to the Canadian Government to 
withdraw the first fifty drifters and sixteen 
trawlers completing.
 Th is  l as t  ac t ion ,  taken  in to 
consideration with all that had gone 
before, decided the Minister to ask the 
Admiralty opinion, through the Colonial 
Office, on the following lines:-
1. What are considered the 
probable chances of attack by 
Above right: HMCS St. Eloi, one of 12 
Battle class naval trawlers ordered 
by the Canadian government, was 
launched on 2 August 1917 at the 
Polson Iron Works in Toronto, Ontario. 
The design of the ships was based on 
North Sea trawlers and they were lightly 
armed with a QF 12-pounder gun and 
depth charges. 
Below right: A row of recently launched 
trawlers, including HMC Ships Festubert, 
St. Eloi, St. Julien and Vimy, await to be 
outfitted at the Polson Iron Works.
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submarines on the Canadian 
Atlantic Coast?
2. On what scale?
3. What defence does Admiralty 
r e c o m m e n d  s h o u l d  b e 
adopted?
4. What does Admiralty propose 
to do in the event of such an 
attack developing to such 
an extent as would point to 
continuance of enemy attempt 
to carry on submarine war on 
this side of the Atlantic?
and to request some definite scheme 
be given Canada to carry out, after 
due consideration of the personnel and 
material available. 
 In order that the Admiralty officials will 
have someone at hand who is touch with 
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local conditions, difficulties of purchases, 
etc., etc., Captain Martin, Superintendent 
of Halifax Dockyard, has been sent to 
London.
 I would call attention to the following:-
 The officers in command of this 
vessels of the Canadian Patrol have 
had, with two exceptions, no knowledge 
of Naval matters prior to the outbreak of 
hostilities, while there is no exception in 
the case of the other officers.
 With regard to the ratings, the 
majority of petty officers are ex R.N., 
while the remainder are in most cases 
volunteers from all ranks of life – from sea 
life very few.
 With this material, unless it is possible 
to lend more persons competent to 
instruct them in the methods in vogue 
as to the use of nets, depth charges, 
paravanes, etc., not very much can be 
expected.
 I t  is  a lso requested that  the 
Department may be kept informed 
as to the developments in the use of 
hydrophones. It is regretted that we have 
no spare officers to send to England to 
obtain this information.
   C E Kingsmill
   Admiral,
  Director of the Naval Service
Top: Canadian Drifter 49. One hundred 
of these 84-foot long wooden anti-
submarine vessels were built at 
Canadian shipyards under contract for 
the British Admiralty. CD-49 arrived at 
Sydney, Nova Scotia for operations in 
July 1918. On her bow is a 6-pounder 
quick-firing gun; the aerial for a wireless 
set can be seen between her masts. 
Depth charges were dropped from the 
stern.
Middle: HMCS Festubert, one of 12 Battle 
class naval trawlers. Commissioned in 
November 1917, she was based at 
Halifax for much of 1918.
Bottom: TR 8, one of the initial batch of 
36 trawlers built in Canada under British 
Admiralty contract and assigned to the 
RCN east coast patrol. Commissioned 
in late June 1918, TR 8 was fitted for 
minesweeping and stationed at Halifax.
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